Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular eavesdropping attack ͓Phys. Rev. A 63, 036301 ͑2001͔͒ that shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping ͓Phys. Rev. A 61, 052312 ͑2000͔͒ is insecure. However, security against this attack can be attained with a simple modification. In addition, a simpler version of the protocol using four qubits is introduced. The particular eavesdropping attack proposed by Zhang, Li, and Guo ͓1͔ shows that the protocol for quantum key distribution introduced in Ref. ͓2͔ is insecure. Here I shall describe a way to elude this eavesdropping attack. I shall use the same notation and scenarios as in Refs. ͓1,2͔. In particular, by ''the Bell operator'' I mean one that has eigenvectors are ͉00͘, ͉01͘, ͉10͘, ͉11͘, as defined in ͓1,2͔.
Alice sends qubit 2 out to Bob and Bob sends qubit 6 out to Alice using a public channel. Then Alice randomly chooses between the following two procedures: ͑i͒ Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3. The result of this measurement will define the key. Then Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 5 and 6, and publicly announces this result. Then Bob measures the Bell operator on qubits 2 and 4. If Eve is not present, the result of this measurement and the public result would allow him to ascertain the key ͑see Table I͒. ͑ii͒ Alice performs the unitary transformation Then Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3 ͑the result of this measurement will define the key͒, and then she measures the Bell operator on qubits 5 and 6, and publicly announces this result. In addition, Alice announces that she has performed the unitary transformation S on qubit 3. In this case, Bob performs the unitary transformation S on qubit 4, and measures the Bell operator on qubits 2 and 4 ͑again, if
Eve is not present the result of this measurement and the public result allow him to ascertain the key; see Table I͒ . Now we will see that Eve's attack suggested in ͓1͔ does not work if Alice chooses procedure ͑ii͒. We shall use the same numbering for the qubits as in ͓1͔. Suppose that Alice performs the transformation S on qubit 3, and then measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3, and obtains the result ''00.'' Then, the state of qubits 2 and 5 becomes ͉ϩϩ͘ 25 . Suppose that when Eve measures the Bell operator on qubits 6 and 8, she obtains the result ''01'' ͑then the state of qubits 4 and 7 becomes ͉01͘ 47 ͒. Then Eve performs the transformation Z on qubit 2, as suggested in ͓1͔. This transformation changes the initial state of qubits 2 and 5, ͉ϩϩ͘ 25 , into the state
Therefore, when Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 2 and 5, the probability of obtaining the result ''00'' is 1 2 , and the probability of obtaining the result ''11'' is 1 2 . Suppose Alice obtains ''11.'' Then, she announces this result and the fact that she has performed the transformation S; i.e., that she has chosen the procedure ͑ii͒. Then Bob performs the transformation S on qubit 4. This transformation changes the initial state of qubits 4 and 7, ͉01͘ 47 , into ͉Ϫϩ͘ 47 .
*Electronic address: adan@cica.es TABLE I. The columns represent, from left to right, the strategy chosen by Alice, the result of her secret measurement on qubits 1 and 3 ͑the key͒, the result of the public measurement on qubits 5 and 6, the result of Bob's secret measurement on qubits 2 and 4, the result that Bob thinks is the key, in all the cases in which the key is ''00,'' and assuming that the initial state is given by Eq. ͑1͒. Therefore, when Bob measures the Bell operator on qubits 4 and 7, the probability of obtaining the result ''00'' is 1 2 , and the probability of obtaining the result ''11'' is 1 2 . Suppose Bob obtains ''00.'' Then Bob infers that, if Eve is not present, the key is ''11.'' However, as we have seen, the key is ''00.'' Therefore, Alice and Bob will detect Eve if they compare their two bits. In addition, once Eve knows that Alice has chosen procedure ͑ii͒, she cannot ascertain whether the key is ''00'' or ''11.'' Table II contains all the possible results of Alice's, Bob's, and Eve's measurements for the two procedures for a particular value of the key ͑''00''͒. It shows that Eve's attack suggested in ͓1͔ works if Alice chooses the procedure ͑i͒, but gives only partial information about the key, and allows Alice and Bob to detect Eve in half of the runs if Alice chooses the procedure ͑ii͒.
There exists an attack that allows Eve to ascertain the key without being detected in case Alice has chosen procedure ͑ii͒. This attack requires a different Bell state measurement on qubits 6 and 8 and different unitary operations on qubit 2. However, this new attack does not allow Eve to obtain the key without being detected if Alice chooses procedure ͑i͒. The security of the protocol relies on Eve necessarily deciding her attack before knowing Alice's choice. Assuming that Alice randomly chooses between ͑i͒ and ͑ii͒, and that Eve randomly chooses between the two different attacks mentioned above, Eve will be detected with a probability 1Ϫ( 3
)
n , where n is the number of pairs of bits compared by Alice and Bob. Thus if N bits are tested, the probability of Eve's detection is 1Ϫ( 3 4 ) N/2 . Therefore, the protocol is less efficient at detecting Eve than BB84 ͓3͔ or B92 ͓4͔. On the other hand, other interesting aspects of the original protocol such as the fact that it delivers one key bit per transmitted bit are retained in the new version.
So far, I have presented a modification of the protocol ͓2͔ that avoids the attack described in Ref. ͓1͔. My aim has been to change the original proposal as little as possible. A simpler protocol for quantum key distribution using entanglement swapping is as follows:
͑a͒ Alice prepares four qubits in the state ͉⌿͘ϭ͉00͘ 12 ͉00͘ 34 , ͑5͒
and sends qubits 2 and 4 to Bob through an insecure quantum channel. ͑b͒ Alice chooses between the following procedures: ͑I͒ doing nothing, ͑II͒ performing S on qubit 1 ͑which changes ͉00͘ 12 into ͉ϩϩ͘ 12 ).
͑c͒ Alice measures de Bell operator on qubits 1 and 3. The result of this measurement defines the key. Then she publicly announces the procedure she has chosen. TABLE II. The columns represent, from left to right, the strategy chosen by Alice, the result of her secret measurement on qubits 1 and 3 ͑the key͒, the result of the public measurement on qubits 5 and 6 ͑5 and 2 in the notation of Ref. ͓1͔͒, the result of Bob's secret measurement on qubits 2 and 4 ͑7 and 4 in the notation of Ref. ͓1͔͒, the result that Bob thinks is the key, the result of Eve's measurement on qubits 6 and 8 ͑in the notation of Ref. ͓1͔͒, the corresponding unitary transformation on qubit 2 ͑as described in Ref. ͓1͔͒, the result that Eve thinks is the key, in all the cases in which the key is ''00, '' and assuming ͑d͒ If Alice chose ͑I͒, then Bob would measure the Bell operator on qubits 2 and 4; if Alice chose ͑II͒, then Bob would perform S on qubit 2 ͑which changes ͉ϩϩ͘ 12 into ͉00͘ 12 ), and would then measure the Bell operator on qubits 2 and 4. In both cases, the result of the Bell operator measurement would allow him to ascertain the key.
In this four-qubit version of the protocol, for each of Alice's procedures, Eve can ascertain the key without being detected if she performs the appropriate Bell state measurement on qubits 2 and 4, and then gives them to Bob in the resulting Bell state. However, as in the six-qubit version, such attack would only work for one of the procedures, and it could be detected in half of the runs of the other procedure.
Both the revised protocol and the new one are secure against a specific attack. It would be desirable to obtain rigorous proofs of security analogous to the proofs of security of the BB84 ͓5-8͔. Indeed, it may not be unfeasible to obtain such proofs as a derivation of the existing ones, since both the revised protocol and the new one have greater similarities with the BB84.
